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TERRORISM, TOURISM, AND TORTS: LIABILITY IN THE
EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK ON A SPORTS OR
ENTERTAINMENT VENUE
I. INTRODUCTION
Trips to "Sin City" Las Vegas, Disney World, or just a day at the
home team's ballpark have long been some of America's treasured
pastimes.1 Whether it is luck at the blackjack table, taking a ride on
Dumbo's Flying Adventure, or cheering for a favorite team at the
stadium, these activities all have two things in common: they re-
present American freedom and American capitalism. The symbolic
values of these activities also make them top terrorist targets. 2 It is
difficult to predict exactly where the next terrorist attack may oc-
cur, but it is clear that no place in America is safe, especially sports
and entertainment venues. 3 Should an attack happen in such a
venue, what are the resulting legal consequences for the venue
owner?4 This Comment answers this question. Section II explains
why sports and entertainment venues are attractive terrorist targets
and what is being done to protect them. 5 Section III examines the
1. See Donna Balancia, Orlando No. 2 as destination, FLA. TODAY, Jan. 15, 2004,
at IC (citing Orlando, Florida, and Las Vegas, Nevada as top vacation spots).
2. For a discussion of sports and entertainment venues as terrorist targets, see
infra notes 9-16 and accompanying text. Las Vegas took a tremendous financial hit
after September l1th because its tourism industry is highly dependent upon air
travel, which came to a virtual halt after September lth. See Hubble Smith, LV
Recovered Quickly from 9-11 Attacks, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Sept. 11, 2004, at IA (discuss-
ing impact of September 11th on Las Vegas). But Las Vegas also made a relatively
quick financial recovery in part because of an advertising campaign portraying Las
Vegas as a place where people could escape from the harsh realities of the post-
September 11th world. See id.
3. See Martha Stoddard, Official: No place safe from terrorism, OMAHA WoRLD-
HERALD, June 16, 2004, at 6A (postulating no place is safe, "not even the fly-over,
low-profile middle of the country"); see also Fear Factor, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Sept. 9, 2004, at 1 A (citing poll finding "Americans are as fearful of becoming
victims of terrorism as they are of losing their jobs or having their homes
burglarized.").
4. For purposes of this Comment, sports and entertainment venues are de-
fined to include amusement parks, casinos, and professional sports stadiums.
5. While many terrorist organizations target the United States, this Comment
focuses specifically on Al Qaeda. Currently, Al Qaeda is deemed to be the greatest
threat to American security. See Current and Projected National Security Threats to the
United States: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 92 (2002) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Dale Watson, Executive Assis-
tant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of
Investigation). Dale Watson identified Al Qaeda as the "most urgent threat to U.S.
interests." Id. Therefore, this Comment focuses on the attractiveness of sports and
(365)
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elements of a potential negligence lawsuit against a venue. 6 Section
IV discusses the legal aftermath of September 1 1th and how it may
set the precedent for government response to future terrorist at-
tacks.7 Section V concludes that in the wake of another terrorist
attack, venue owners are not likely to be held liable in tort.8 None-
theless, upgraded security measures should still be implemented.
II. SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT VENUES AS POTENTIAL
TERRORIST TARGETS
A. Why Target Sports and Entertainment Venues?
Sports and entertainment venues are types of "soft targets"
prone to a terrorist attack for three main reasons.9 First, these ve-
nues are symbolic. American sports symbolize American culture. 10
Entertainment venues and casinos in particular, represent Ameri-
can capitalism."' Second, these venues are difficult to secure be-
cause large numbers of people are constantly entering and leaving
entertainment venues as a target to Al Qaeda. For a discussion of sports and en-
tertainment venues as terrorist targets and what is being done to protect them, see
infra notes 9-27 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of negligence law suits, see infra notes 28-109 and accom-
panying text.
7. For a discussion of legislative responses to the September 11th terrorist
attacks, see infra notes 115-46 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of why sports and entertainment venue owners are not
likely to be held liable in tort because of superceding and intervening causes, see
infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
9. "Soft targets" are targets which are not well-protected so terrorists can gain
access to them relatively easily. See CNN Breaking News 15:30: Baghdad Hotel Blast
(CNN television broadcast, Mar. 17, 2004) (defining soft targets as those "readily
available" to terrorists); see also Tom Clonan, Any time any place, IRISH TIMES, Oct.
26, 2002, at W1 (opining on terrorists' shifting focus to civilian "soft targets"); Ca-
nada AM: New Year's Eve Terrorist Threats (CTV television broadcast, Dec. 31, 2002)
[hereinafter Canada AM] (discussing Times Square as terrorist target). Times
Square on New Year's Eve is a soft target because terrorists "can come and go
rather quickly, where they can get in with the least amount of people checking
them." Canada AM, supra.
10. See Symposium, Panel 1: Legal Issues in Sports Security, 13 FoRDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENTr. L.J. 349, 366 (2003) [hereinafter Fordham Symposium] ("Ameri-
can sports is a very symbolic target of terrorism because it is so associated with the
globalization of the American economy and the American culture."); see alsoJared
Wade, Safeguarding the Meadowlands, RISK MGMT., Dec. 2002, at 18 (claiming sports
venues are attractive targets because, "[w] ith tens of thousands of people in attend-
ance, an attack on a stadium could cause massive casualties with maximum media
exposure").
11. "Las Vegas Sheriff-elect Bill Young" was harshly criticized for commenting
that because Las Vegas is "America's playground, .. . we have to be a prime target
for fundamentalists whose beliefs are radically different from ours." Steve Friess,
Securing America's playground, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 31, 2003, at 37.
[Vol. 12: p. 365
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the facilities. 12 Small areas with lots of people are especially suscep-
tible to chemical terrorist attacks. 13 For a chemical attack to be ef-
fective, an indoor or closed environment is needed so that toxins
can affect people quickly.14 Third, tourist venues have been at-
tacked in other countries, demonstrating the desirability of these
locations. 15 Fortunately, such attacks have not been successful in
the United States. 16 It is for these reasons that venue owners must
be vigilant in their security efforts.
B. What is Being Done to Protect Sports &
Entertainment Venues?
Venue owners have implemented a variety of preventative se-
curity measures, sometimes with the involvement of state and fed-
12. See Donald Schmidt, From Green to Seeing Red, AccEss CONTROL & SECURITY
Sys., Aug. 2004, at 36 ("Hotel, lodging and convention facilities, for example, face
unique security challenges because they encounter a constant flow of guests, ven-
dors, deliveries and vehicles that vary on a daily basis."); see also Is Your Store a
Terrorist Target?, IOMA's SECUrITY DIRECTOR's REP., Feb. 2003, at 4-5 (discussing
difficulty of securing public spaces like retail stores and shopping malls).
13. SeeJohn M. Barkett, If Terror Reigns, Will Torts Follow?, 9 WIDENER L. SvMp.
J. 485, 500 (2003) (stating chemical terrorist attacks would be more successful in-
doors). Other types of terrorist attacks including biological, radioactive, and con-
ventional threats pose different implications for tort liabilities. See id. at 501-29.
14. See id. at 496-501 (describing chemical terrorist attack).
15. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 124 (noting terrorists' shifting focus towards
"soft" targets as government secures "hard" targets); see also Winston P. Nagan &
Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 BERKE-
LEYJ. INT'L L. 375, 422 n.200 (2004) (noting government awareness of terrorism).
"The United States has known for over a decade that increased security at hard
targets has shifted terrorists' attention to soft targets. In 1990, 75% of all terrorist
attacks worldwide were perpetrated against tourist spots, businesses, and other
nonofficial targets." Nagan & Hammer, supra, at 422 n.200; see also Raymond Bon-
ner, Bombing at Resort in Indonesia Kills 150 and Hurts Scores More, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
13, 2002, at 1 (reporting terrorist bombing of Bali nightclub). See generally GreggJ.
Loubier & Jason B. Aro, Insuring the Risks of Terror, L.A. LAWYER, Sept. 2002, at 18
(observing terrorist attack in foreign countries is 'Just as likely to occur in a subur-
ban pizza parlor or crowded office plaza as it is at a national landmark"); Steven E.
Roberts, Improve tourism safety, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 2004, at 31 (citing Madrid train
attack as "further example of terrorism that specifically targets travel and tour-
ism"); Michael Wines, Chechens Seize Moscow Theater, Taking as Many as 600 Hostages,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2002, at Al (reporting terrorist take-over of crowded Moscow
theater).
16. There was one recent unsuccessful plan to attack a shopping mall in
Ohio. See David Johnston, Somali Is Accused of Planning a Terror Attack at a Shopping
Center in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2004, at A16 (discussing indictment of Somali
man with Al Qaeda ties who allegedly planned to blow up shopping mall); see also
Lisa Hoffman, Recent cases point to vulnerability of 'soft targets, at http://www.shns.
com/shns/g index2.cfm?action=detail&pk=SOFTTERROR-06-14-04 (June 14,
2004) (discussing vulnerability of soft targets in light of recently revealed plots to
blow up shopping malls and apartment buildings and Al Qaeda's plans to recruit
people who do not look Middle Eastern to attack "soft targets").
20051
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eral governments. In Nevada, a state law requires resort hotels to
create emergency response plans. 17 The National Football League
("NFL") made efforts to improve stadium security when it organ-
ized a task force to create a plan for "best practices for NFL stadi-
ums and best practices for security."' The Meadowlands Sports
Complex (home to the New York Giants) was prompted in part by
its proximity to New York City to dramatically increase its security
measures. 19 Disney World has improved its security as well.2 0 The
famed theme park recently added the same type of barricades used
to protect "the White House, U.S. embassies and nuclear-waste de-
pots." 21 Disney World and Disney Land also successfully lobbied
Congress to pass a law permanently declaring the airspace over
both parks as no-fly zones. 22 A recent federal law made restrictions
17. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 31 (describing Nevada law requirements).
An emergency response plan must include such information as "the hotel's access
routes .... notice regarding the presence of unusually hazardous substances and
• .. an evacuation plan that would be implemented during an actual emergency."
Id.; see also Anjeanette Damon, No teeth in state's emergency response law, RENO GA-
ZETrE-J., Nov. 1, 2003, at 1A (criticizing 2003 Nevada law requiring hotels create
emergency plans because of law's lack of enforcement provision); Schmidt, supra
note 12, at 4 (noting importance of emergency response plans to insurance carri-
ers especially in facilities "where a large number of people gather").
18. Fordham Symposium, supra note 10, at 352. One challenge in trying to im-
plement NFL policies in individual stadiums is that the NFL commissioner does
not have direct control over all stadiums. See id. Rather, "[t] hese venues are owned
by cities, states and in some instances, the team owners themselves." Id. The NFL
attempted to ensure individual stadium compliance by hiring an independent se-
curity firm to audit stadiums. See id. at 353. The audit confirmed that most stadi-
ums are in fact compliant. See id.
19. See Wade, supra note 10, at 18-22 (detailing Meadowlands Sports Com-
plex's changes in security, financial impact of changes, and evaluating effectiveness
of changes). Some of the more significant security improvements include: an in-
creased presence of security personnel, a pat-down of every costumer entering the
stadium, and a crack down on what items are allowed to be brought into the sta-
dium. See id. at 20.
20. See Sean Mussenden, Disney buys anti-terror barricades, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL,
May 16, 2004, at B9 (reviewing Disney World's post-September 11th security
improvements).
21. See id. (describing barriers added to Disney World).
22. See Sean Mussenden & Henry Pierson Curtis, No-fly zones shield Disney's re-
sorts, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 11, 2003, at Al (recounting passage of law banning
flights above Disney theme parks). A no-fly zone bars "planes from flying below
3,000 feet within 3 miles of the center of the parks ...." Id. at A20. This flight
restriction is suppose to prevent a terrorist from getting a plane close enough to
the theme park to attack it. See id. Some local aerial advertisers are critical of the
federal law, claiming that it will not protect against a terrorist attack and that Dis-
ney's real motive in seeking passage of the law was to stifle aerial advertisements
that lure Disney visitors to neighboring entertainment venues. See id. Some also
question why Disney is one of the few private sector locations with permanently
closed airspace. See id. at A21. Other "targets of symbolic value, including Minne-
sota's Mall of America, other Central Florida theme parks such as SeaWorld Or-
[Vol. 12: p. 365
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on airspace over certain sports stadiums permanent as well 2 3 Drills
are conducted to ensure that venues are ready in the event of an
attack. The Department of Homeland Security sponsors drills to
train personnel at "soft targets" on how to handle a terrorist at-
tack.24 Las Vegas also conducted a preparedness drill of its own
involving the release of a mock aerial plague on the Las Vegas
strip.25 But venue owners' implementation of upgraded security
measures is not entirely altruistic. 26 Improved security is motivated
in part by fear of negligence suits.
27
III. NEGLIGENCE LAWSUITS ARISING FROM A TERRORIST ArACK
A. Negligence Lawsuits
To win a negligence suit, a plaintiff must prove five elements:
(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defen-
lando and Universal Orlando, and downtown Chicago, home of the Sears Tower,
America's tallest building" have not received the same protections. Id.
23. See Karen Lee Scrivo, There Oughta Be a Law; Stadium Ban Sends Aerial Ad-
vertisers Into Tailspin, NAT'LJ.'s CONG. DAILY, Mar. 15, 2004 (describing permanent
ban on flights over "MLB [Major League Baseball] and NFL stadiums .... National
Collegiate Athletic Association Division I football and major speedway events at
stadiums with 30,000 seats or more"). SenatorJohn Breaux (D-La.), a supporter of
the bill, stated, "[s]tadiums have instituted numerous measures on the ground to
tighten security, but we need to install proper safeguards in stadium airspace as
well. Americans deserve to feel as secure as possible while sitting in these exposed
stadiums." Id.; see, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-7, § 352, 117 Stat. 11, 420-21 (2003) (establishing flight restrictions over stadi-
ums and similar venues); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
199, § 521(a), 118 Stat. 3, 343 (2004) (extending flight restrictions over stadiums
and other venues indefinitely).
24. See Shaun Waterman, Training against terrorism uses malls, at http://wash-
ingtontimes.com/business/200 30 7 17-095939-8773r.htm (July 18, 2003) (discuss-
ing Department of Homeland Security's pilot "counterterrorism training program
for the staff of shopping malls, sports stadiums, [and] amusement parks" that will
provide training on "the 'four Ds'-devaluing the target; deterring would-be ter-
rorists; detecting attacks and preoperational surveillance or other preparations;
and defending against attacks"); see also Barkett, supra note 13, at 512 (discussing
devastating results of "hypothetical smallpox bioattack in shopping malls").
25. See Sean Whaley, Guinn touts value of bioterror drill, LAs VEGAS REv.-J., Aug.
20, 2003, at 7B (describing "bioterrorism preparedness drill").
26. See Fordham Symposium, supra note 10, at 353 (quoting Milton Ahlerich,
Vice President of Security for NFL). In describing why NFL team and stadium
owners implemented improved security measures since September 1lth, Ahlerich
noted that implementing these improvements is "first and foremost .... a business
decision." Id.
27. One attorney involved in the drafting of new NFL security measures com-
mented, "'[y]ou are creating a very, very dangerous set of documents.'" Id. at 393.
Another attorney advised lawyers counseling sports venue clients that "to the ex-
tent to which there are Best Practices developed in your industry, if your client is
not abiding by those Best Practices, that will be Exhibit 1 in any litigation." Id. at
392.
2005]
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dant breached that duty; (3) the defendant factually caused the
plaintiff's harm; (4) the defendant should be legally liable for the
harm caused to the plaintiff; and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages
as a result of the injury.28 One type of negligence occurs when a
member of the public is injured by a third-party's criminal act while
at a business establishment. 29 Should a venue fall victim to a terror-
ist attack, a negligence suit could result.3 0
The visitors to the venue are the largest class of potential plain-
tiffs.3 1 The type of owner of the venue will determine whether they
are liable. 32 Amusement parks are generally owned by private cor-
porations and are thus subject to traditional tort law.3 3 Other
venue owners can not be sued in tort. Some casinos are owned not
28. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS § 114 (2000) (outlining elements
needed for negligence). A duty of care is generally defined as "the duty of reason-
able care under the circumstances, no more, no less." Id. § 115.
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT]. This section describes landowner liability as follows:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his busi-
ness purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they
are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the
accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons ...
and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or
otherwise to protect them against it.
Id.; see also Josephine M. Pottebaum, Note, Missouri Supreme Court Clarifies: Siding
with Business Owners in Negligent Security Actions May Have Been Wrong All Along, 68Mo. L. REv. 505, 505 (2003) (analyzing L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co.,
L.P., 75 S.W.3d 247 (Mo. 2002)). A recent Missouri Supreme Court opinion
changed a longstanding Missouri law that barred customers injured on a business
owner's premises from suing. See Pottebaum, supra, at 505. The Missouri Supreme
Court allowed a patron injured in a shopping mall to sue the mall owner "as a
third party beneficiary of the contract between the shopping center and the secur-
ity company. . . ." Id.
30. See Melinda L. Reynolds, Note, Landowner Liability for Terrorist Acts, 47 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 155, 169-79 (1996) (analyzing negligence suit against landowner
arising from terrorist attack).
31. SeeJosh Romero, A Victim's Eye View of the September l1th Victim Compensation
Fund, DEF. COUNS. J., Jan. 2004, at 68 (noting World Trade Center and Pentagon
ground victims as largest group of victims of September 11 th attack). Other cate-gories of September 11th victims include plane passengers, damaged property
owners, and holders of life insurance plans. See id. at 65-66. Other possible plain-
tiffs in the hypothetical include employees of the venue or neighboring property
owners whose property is injured by the attack.
32. See supra note 4 (noting sports and entertainment venues are defined to
include amusement parks, casinos, and professional sports stadiums).
33. See Walt Disney World Co. v. Goode, 501 So. 2d 622, 626-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986) (affirming jury award against Disney in tort).
[Vol. 12: p. 365
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by private corporations, but by Native American tribes.34 In fact,
tribes own some of the largest casinos in the United States. 35 Sover-
eign immunity protects them from a tort suit.36 Sovereign immu-
nity also protects the large number of sports stadiums owned by city
or state governments.37 Many states have laws granting immunity to
34. See Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 Wyo. L. REV.
427, 427 (2001) ("[A] little more than one third of the 556 federally-recognized
Indian tribes nationwide, operate Indian gaming facilities.") (footnote omitted).
35. See The Largest Casinos in the United States, at http://www.jetcafe.org/-npc/
gambling/casino size.html (last updated Jan. 2, 2005) (listing six of top twenty
casinos in United States are owned by Native American Tribes). The two largest
casinos in the United States are Foxwoods, located in Ledyard, CT and owned by
the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, and Mohegan Sun, located in Uncansville, CT
and owned by the Mohegan Tribe. See id.
36. See Frazier v. Turning Stone Casino, 254 F. Supp. 2d 295, 315 (N.D.N.Y.
2003) (dismissing boxer's civil rights suit against casino owned by Native American
tribe). The court explained the meaning of sovereign immunity as follows:
Native American tribes are "'domestic dependent nations' that exercise
inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories." Absent
a clear and unequivocal waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation,
the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity bars suits for damages against a
tribe, including suits arising from its off-reservation commercial activities
and the activities of a tribal entity such as the Casino.
Id. at 305 (citations omitted). The federal government is also usually immune
from suit in tort. See DOBBS, supra note 28, at § 261 (discussing government immu-
nity under Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2004)). There is a lawsuit
pending against the federal government arising from the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing. See Bombing Victims Sue, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 31, 1997, at A8 (describing no-
tice filed by 34 bomb victims' families). The basis of the plaintiffs claim is that
"'[t] he United States government neglected to protect persons in and around the
Murrah Building, despite knowing that terrorists had discussed plans for violence
before April 19, 1995 .... '" Id. The suit has not yet gone forward because not
enough evidence has been gathered. See Like Oklahoma Incident?, CONN. L. TRIB.,
Sept. 17, 2001 (stating opinion of attorney for Oklahoma City bombing victims
that September l1th will not impact his potential suit because of distinction be-
tween foreign versus domestic terrorists).
37. See DOBBS, supra note 28, at § 268 (noting states have "traditional sover-
eign immunity from suit"); see also Fordham Symposium, supra note 10, at 352 (dis-
cussing ownership of stadium venues by cities and states, but sometimes teams
themselves). See generally Leagues & Properties, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J.: By
THE NUMBERS: THE AUTHORITATIVE ANN. RES. GUIDE & FACr BOOK, 2002, at 66-134,
142-44 (listing team and stadium ownership as for every baseball, basketball, foot-
ball, hockey, motorsport, soccer, golf, tennis, and extreme sports team in U.S.);
Stadiums in the United States, at http://www.worldstadiums.com/northameiica/counties/
unitedstates.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2005) (listing stadiums throughout world in-
cluding state-by-state listing of all 1,395 stadiums in United States).
2005]
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state-owned recreation facilities.38 The only possible defendants
may be team owners leasing stadiums from the government.39
B. Applying the Negligence Framework to a Hypothetical
Terrorist Attack
Consider the following hypothetical: during a football game, a
truck bomb explodes outside Giants Stadium in East Rutherford,
New Jersey.40 The largest class of potential plaintiffs is the fans in-jured while attending the game.41 The likely defendants are the
owners of the New York Giants. 42 This hypothetical examines the
38. See DOBBS, supra note 28, at § 238 (noting state statutes limiting liabilityfor recreation facilities though usually limited to recreational facilities for which
there is no charge); see also William E. Westerbeke, The Immunity Provisions in theKansas Tort Claims Act: The First Twenty-Five Years, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 939, 941(2004) (describing Kansas historically following common law doctrine of sovereignimmunity from tort suit); see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7 5-6104(o) (2003) (statinggovernment immunity from suit for injury at state owned recreational facilities);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-7 (2004) (stating same as Kansas statute).
39. For a discussion of owner liability in the context of the New York Giants,
see infra note 42 and accompanying text. Further complications might develop if a
terrorist attack occurred at a state owned sports venue not being used by the sports
team, but for another event. For example, "[p]romoters and other sports event
organizers often use [sports stadium facilities] for only a day or a few days." GLENN
M. WONG, ESSENTIL-S OF SPORTS LAw § 4.5 (3d ed. 2002). A promoter might rent a
sports stadium venue for: concerts, ice shows, circuses, boxing matches, or other
events. See id. Thus, their liability in the event that a spectator is injured may differfrom the stadium owner whose facility the promoter is leasing. See id. A promoter
might be responsible for exercising reasonable care in regard to supervising their
specific event, but a stadium owner would be responsible for "patent defects" in
the stadium or its security. See id.; see also O'Connell v. N.J. Sports & ExpositionAuth., 766 A.2d 786, 788 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (noting promoter and
sponsor of sporting event do not owe duty to injured security guard).
40. For a discussion of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, see infra notes57-59 and accompanying text. This hypothetical situation was chosen because it
represents a similar type of attack to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Gi-
ants Stadium was chosen as the venue because of its proximity to Manhattan, the
site of the September 11th attacks. See Fordham Symposium, supra note 10, at 357
n.33 (noting proximity of Giants Stadium to World Trade Center); compare Barkett,
supra note 13, at 541-43 (hypothesizing on tort consequences of hypothetical sui-
cide bomber in shopping mall during holidays if Congress does not intervene withinsurance coverage) with hypothetical posed in this Comment.
41. For a discussion of different classes of plaintiffs, see supra note 31. Otherplaintiffs relevant to our hypothetical might include employees of the New York
Giants and the opposing team, or people owning property near the stadium whoseproperty is damaged by flying debris. The fans attending the game were selected
as plaintiffs for purposes of this Comment because of the inability to explore everypossible scenario. Further, fans would likely be the largest class of potential plain-
tiffs and are most analogous to victims of the September 11th and 1993 World
Trade Center attacks.
42. See Front Office, GIANTS.COM, at http://www.giants.com/team/
frontoffice.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2005) (listing employees of New York Giants).The New York Giants are currently owned by Wellington Mara and Preston Tisch.See id. Giants Stadium itself is owned by the New Jersey Sports and Exposition
[Vol. 12: p. 365
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specific negligence elements of duty, breach of duty, factual causa-
don, and proximate causation. 43 Civil suits filed in real terrorist
attacks are compared with the hypothetical.
1. Duty
As the first part of their claim, the injured fans need to prove
the New York Giants owed them a "duty of care."'44 Historically, the
group owing patrons a duty of protection from third-party criminal
acts has been narrowly defined. 45 Today, business owners owe their
patrons a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them from
harm. 46 It is easiest for plaintiffs to establish a duty under this gen-
eral definition. 47 Conversely, the totality of the circumstances test is
Authority ("NJSEA") and the New York Giants are tenants of the stadium. See Gi-
ants Stadium Facts & Figures, MEADOWLANDS.COM, at http://www.meadowlands.
com/giantsFacts.asp?navID= 7 (last visited Apr. 1, 2005). Liability for a terrorist
attack would likely fall to the owners of the New York Giants team and not the
NJSEA because the NJSEA is a government entity generally immune from suit. See
supra notes 37-38; see also O'Connell, 766 A.2d at 791-92. When a plaintiff was in-
jured by snow that was not removed from the aisles, the court dismissed a lawsuit
against NJSEA, but not the New York Giants. See O'Connell, 766 A.2d at 791-92.
The court recognized that the New York Giants, as lessees, had a duty to third
parties "to have the premises in a reasonably safe condition." Id. at 790. But the
dismissal of the NJSEA may have been meaningless since the New York Giants may
be able to sue for indemnification under their lease agreement. See id. at 791 n.2;
see also Vanchieri v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 514 A.2d 1323, 1324-27 (N.J.
1986) (holding defendant, security company, could not benefit from NJSEA's sov-
ereign immunity from liability for plaintiff injured by another fan during football
game in absence of proof that security company had acted using security plans and
deployment provided by NJSEA); Rodriguez v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 472
A.2d 146, 148 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (holding NJSEA immune from suit
because state law grants public entities "immunity from liability for injuries and
damages resulting from the failure to provide police protection or the failure to
provide sufficient police protection").
43. For purposes of this Comment, damages are not examined because the
other four elements are likely to be the more contentious elements.
44. See DOBBS, supra note 28, at § 115 (explaining duty as first element needed
to prove negligence suit).
45. See id. § 324 (noting under traditional negligence law, liability for third-
party acts was limited to common carriers). Today, most courts follow the rule that
all businesses, including sports and entertainment venues, may be held liable for
third-party acts. See id.; see also Thomas C. Homburger & Timothy J. Grant, A
Changing World: A Commercial Landlord's Duty to Prevent Terrorist Attacks in Post-Septem-
ber 11th America, 36J. MARSHALL L. REv. 669, 670-71 n.6, 671-72 n.7 (2003) (com-
paring historical cases where no duty to protect against third-party criminal acts
was found with modem cases finding such duty); WONG, supra note 39, at § 4.5
(describing duty owed by sports venues to protect guests from harm).
46. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, at § 344 cmt. d (defining duty to exercise
"reasonable care" for business owners who open their land to public).
47. See DOBBS, supra note 28, at § 115 (stating "[i]n the ordinary case.... the
defendant does owe a duty of care").
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9
Piccarello: Terrorism, Tourism, and Torts: Liability in the Event of a Terror
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
374 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
a slightly more restrictive standard.48 This test does not impose
blanket liability as a matter of law, but instead considers every factor
the defendant should have known. 49 Some courts define duty more
narrowly by using a "prior similar incidents" test.50 At its most re-
strictive application, this rule imposes liability only if similar inci-
dents previously occurred on the landowner's property.51 Finally,
some courts utilize the assumption of duty approach to define
duty.5 2 Assumption of duty occurs only when the venue owner "ex-
pressly or implicitly promise[s] to provide security."53 A court uses
the venue owner's actions as the basis for which to impose duty.54
2. Applying Duty in Previous Civil Suits and the Hypothetical
In the context of September 11 th litigation, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York used a general definition of
duty to find that a duty existed.55 Therefore, the court declined to
dismiss a civil suit filed on behalf of victims' families against the
airlines and similarly situated defendants. 56 The plaintiffs in the
48. See id. at § 324 (explaining totality of circumstances test).
49. See id. (noting requirement of previous incident occurring on landowners
premises as conservative approach).
50. Compare id. (defining "prior similar incidents" test), with RESTATEMENT,
supra note 29, at § 344 cmt. f (defining reasonable care as not necessarily depen-
dent upon prior incidents). Section 344 cmt. f provides:[A Business owner] may . . .know or have reason to know, from past
experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third per-
sons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor, even
though he has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individ-
ual. If. . . [the business owner] should reasonably anticipate careless or
criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some
particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it,
and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a rea-
sonable protection.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, at § 344 cmt. f.
51. See DOBBS, supra note 28, at § 324 (explaining restrictive application of
prior similar incidents" test).
52. See Homburger & Grant, supra note 45, at 678 (discussing landlord assum-
ing duty to her tenant). The Homburger and Grant landlord-tenant analysis can
be analogized to the hypothetical. The New York Giants are "in effect" landlords
to the fans who fill the role of the tenant. It is this landlord-tenant relationship
that creates the duty from the New York Giants to the fans.
53. Id.
54. See id. (describing court use of assumption of duty in landlord-tenant
context).
55. See In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding
defendant airlines, airplane manufacturer, airport security companies, Port Au-
thority of N.Y. and NJ., and World Trade Center property owner owed duty to
ground victims injured on September 11 th as matter of law).
56. See id. The court reasoned that imposing a duty did not open the defend-
ants to limitless liability. See id. The class of plaintiffs is not infinite and Congress
has capped the maximum amount of damages that could be recovered. See id. at
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hypothetical would probably face a similar result. When duty is de-
fined so broadly, it is unlikely a court would find the New York Gi-
ants did not owe fans a general duty of reasonable care.
Unlike the broad definition used for September 11 th plaintiffs,
the New York Supreme Court applied a totality of the circum-
stances analysis to a civil suit brought on behalf of victims of the
1993 World Trade Center bombing.57 The 1993 bombing is factu-
ally similar to the hypothetical because it involved a truck bomb in
the parking garage of the World Trade Center.58 In that case, the
court found a duty existed. 59 This would be helpful precedent for
plaintiffs in the hypothetical. In deciding if a duty existed, a court
considers such facts as the likelihood of the attack on that day, any
information the New York Giants had about a specific attack, and if
similarly situated venues had been attacked before.60 A court apply-
ing the totality of circumstances test to the hypothetical would find
293. But see AnthonyJ. Sebok, Judge Hellerstein's Ruling on the September 11 Suits: Is It
Right About New York Tort Law?, FINDLAw.COM, at http://writ.findlaw.com/sebok/
20031006.html (Oct. 6, 2003) (criticizing Hellerstein's ruling for misinterpreting
N.Y. law regarding duty "to the world" and questioning whether determination
would hold for future plaintiffs similarly situated). For a further discussion of Sep-
tember 11 th civil suits, see infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
57. See In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d 713, 736 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2004). The court defined duty as follows: "The Port Authority's duty is
defined by what risks or dangers were and should reasonably have been antici-
pated by the Port Authority from having a high profile building, with a public
parking garage under it, which permitted 'unvetted' vehicles to enter and exit
without encountering any barriers or surveillance." Id. But see Gross v. Empire
State Bldg. Assocs., 773 N.Y.S.2d 354, 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (dismissing claim
against Port Authority for lack of duty). Gross involved an incident where a man
opened fire on the observation deck of the Empire State Building killing one tour-
ist, injuring six more, and then killing himself. See id. The court explained its
unwillingness to define duty as the plaintiff suggested:
[Ilt simply cannot be said that in 1997, when, as defendants aptly note,
metal detectors were much less prevalent than today, the Empire State
Building and its landlords could reasonably have foreseen the events of
February 23, 1997 [a man opening fire on the observation deck] and be
held to the duty urged by plaintiffs, namely the use of x-ray machines,
metal detectors and scanners together with armed security guards and
the inspection of all bags and packages.
Id. (footnote omitted).
58. See In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d at 723 (stating facts of
case).
59. See id. at 736 (explaining why duty found in case).
60. See id. at 738 (listing facts known to defendant). The court noted that the
Port Authority should have been aware of specific factors indicating an attack was
imminent. See id. (stating Port Authority knew "domestic terrorism was rising, the
WTC [World Trade Center] was an attractive terrorist target, car bombs were be-
coming the terrorists' method of choice, and the underground parking garage was
highly vulnerable to a terrorist attack").
375.2005]
11
Piccarello: Terrorism, Tourism, and Torts: Liability in the Event of a Terror
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
376 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
a duty existed, assuming there was information indicating the New
York Giants should have known of the possibility of an attack.
The "prior similar incidents" test poses more of a challenge for
the hypothetical plaintiffs.6 1 A court adopting this definition of
duty will not recognize that the New York Giants must protect their
fans from terrorism because no terrorist attacks have occurred at
Giants Stadium.62 From a public policy perspective, this would be
an unpopular result. A court may decline to apply the "prior simi-
lar incidents" test by simply deeming terrorism as a unique type of
third-party criminal act to which the traditional "prior similar inci-
dents" test should not apply.63
Under assumption of duty analysis, security improvements are
used to define duty.6 4 Giants Stadium implemented a variety of se-
curity upgrades since September 1 1th, including ones specifically
aimed at restricting vehicle access to the stadium. 65 A court apply-
ing the assumption of duty approach will view these steps as evi-
dence of assumption of duty and impose liability on the New York
Giants. In summary, under every test but the antiquated "prior sim-
ilar incidents" test, a court would find that the New York Giants
owed its fans a duty of care.
3. Breach of Duty
Next, injured fans would need to show that Giants Stadium did
not have the safety precautions of a reasonable sports stadium and
the New York Giants therefore breached the duty they owed to the
fans.66 Reasonable care does not mean, though, that the New York
Giants must "guarantee safety."67 Determining whether a defen-
61. See id. at 735 (rejecting implicitly "prior similar incidents" test by stating
"landlord does not need to have had a past experience with the exact criminal
activity, in the same place, and of the same type, before liability can be imposed for
failing to take reasonable precautions to discover, warn, or protect").
62. See DOBBS, supra note 28, at § 324 (defining "prior similar incidents" test
as requiring previous crimes of similar nature to have occurred on landowner's
premises before liability is imposed).
63. See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 169-70 (noting difficulty of applying negli-
gence principles to terrorist attack).
64. See Homburger & Grant, supra note 45, at 670 (identifying assumption of
duty in context of landlord's use of security in post-September 1 th world).
65. See Wade, supra note 10, at 20 (noting vehicles no longer allowed under
Giants Stadium during games and delivery vehicles are restricted and searched).
66. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, at § 283 cmt. b ("The words 'reasonable
man' denote a person exercising those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelli-
gence, and judgment which society requires of its members for the protection of
their own interests and the interests of others.").
67. DOBBS, supra note 28, at § 324 (discussing limits of landowner's duty); see
also Gross v. Empire State Bldg. Assocs., 773 N.Y.S.2d 354, 355 (N.Y. App. Div.
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dant acted reasonably is normally a question of fact for the jury to
decide. 68 What a jury may view as reasonable security measures to-
day may be higher than what they were before September 11th.
69
Reasonable security measures are viewed in light of any specific
warnings given to the venue indicating that an attack was foresee-
able. 70 Venue owners have a duty to inform the public of credible
threats to their safety. 71 If the New York Giants had specific infor-
mation indicating that an attack was foreseeable, but failed to re-
spond appropriately, they breached their duty of care. The jury
could examine security measures implemented at other sports stadi-
ums to determine if the New York Giants were in accord with indus-
2004) (stating "landlords are not insurers of the safety of those who use their
premises"); Homburger & Grant, supra note 45, at 681-82 (discussing landlord's
duty). "Like a landlord's pre-September 11th common-law duty to protect against
third-party criminal acts, a landlord is not an insurer against such terrorist attacks
from occurring." Homburger & Grant, supra note 45, at 681-82.
68. See DOBBS, supra note 28, at § 115 (outlining elements of negligence suit).
69. See Ed Bethune et al., What's Expected Now: The "reasonable man" standard for
liability is much higher since Sept. 11, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at 24 (noting new
definition of "reasonable man"). "Today's reasonable man is not the same man he
was before Sept. 11. What the public - the community that is the reasonable man -
considers foreseeable with respect to terrorism and what it regards as reasonable
steps to prevent terrorist attacks have been fundamentally altered." Id.; see also
Homburger & Grant, supra note 45, at 682 (observing landowners may "now be
required to take all reasonable steps to make the premises safe and secure from
terrorist attacks because these attacks are now foreseeable").
70. See Steve Friess, In Vegas, fear and insecurity cloud denials of terror threat, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Aug. 13, 2004, at A8 [herinafter Vegas Threat] (describing events lead-
ing up to press leak). in August 2004, it was leaked to the press that casino officials
declined to view video tapes given to them by the FBI that were collected from
terrorists and suggested the terrorists may be targeting Las Vegas casinos. See id.
Allegedly, the officials did not want to view the tapes for fear of being sued for
negligence should they have viewed them and not responded with appropriate
security measures. See Editorial, Hedging their bets, TIMES UNION (N.Y.), Aug. 16,
2004, at A6. Some have argued in response to the Las Vegas casino owner's failure
to take the FBI warnings seriously that the law should be changed so that "anyone
in a position of responsibility who deliberately ignores a potential terror threat is
subject to treble liability and criminal penalties." Id.; see also Bethune, supra note
69, at 24 (suggesting companies use outside counsel in preparing security assess-
ment reports to prevent use of information later in litigation as evidence of com-
pany awareness of security risks).
71. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, at § 344 (describing landowner's duty "to
exercise reasonable care to . . .give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to
avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it"); see also DOBBS, supra note
28, at § 324 (stating "landowners who open their land to the public for business...
[must exercise] care against harms that are generally foreseeable even when the
wrongdoer's presence is not known and the wrongdoer himself not specifically
identifiable") (footnote omitted). In response to the August 2004 incident, casino
officials argued that the information reported to them did not indicate a "specific
and credible threat." See Vegas Threat, supra note 70, at A8 (quoting statements of
Las Vegas officials responding to allegations that they failed to disclose possible
terror threat to public).
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try CUStOm. 7 2 If the measures implemented by the New York Giants
were reasonable, the jury could conclude that there was no
breach. 73 If, however, the jury did find the venue breached their
duty of care, the analysis turns to factual causation.
4. Factual Causation
Assuming the injured fans could establish the New York Giants
owed them a duty of care and that the New York Giants breached
that duty, the fans must then establish that the defendant's actions
caused them real harm.7 4 Some jurisdictions apply the factual cau-
sation concept by using a "but for" test.75 In other words, "but for"
the truck being allowed outside of Giants Stadium and exploding,
the plaintiffs would not have been injured. For the hypothetical
plaintiffs, establishing factual causation is not a major obstacle. A
72. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, at § 295A cmt. b (defining use of custom
in negligence suit). Section 295A defines the use of custom as follows:
Evidence of the custom is admissible, and is relevant, as indicating a com-
posite judgment as to the risks of the situation and the precautions re-
quired to meet them, as well as the feasibility of such precautions, the
difficulty of any change in accepted methods, the actor's opportunity to
learn what is called for, and the justifiable expectation of others that he
will do what is usual, as well as the justifiable expectation of the actor that
others will do the same.
Id.; see also Homburger & Grant, supra note 45, at 675 (quoting Kline v. 1500 Mass.
Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). In Kline, "the court
emphasized that particular landlord-tenant situations and evidence of custom
among landlords of the same building type 'may play a significant role in deter-
mining if [the] standard [of reasonable care] has been met.'" Id.
There has been some indication that not all Las Vegas casinos have followed
Nevada's law requiring casinos to file emergency response plans. See Damon, supra
note 17, at 1A (discussing small number of Northern Nevada resort hotels comply-
ing with emergency preparedness law). This type of omission may be regarded as a
failure to take all reasonable safety precautions, especially those customary to
other casinos. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, at § 295A cmt. b (defining use of
custom in negligence suit). Should these casinos then be sued if they fell victim to
a terrorist attack, a jury may find they breached their duty of reasonable care. See
DOBBS, supra note 28, at § 114 (noting jury responsible for determining breach of
duty). For a discussion of the improved security measures that have been taken by
sports and entertainment venues, see supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
73. See DOBBS, supra note 28, at § 114 (discussing jury determination that de-
fendant did not breach duty of care).
74. See id. § 115. The Restatement combines factual and legal causation into
one category of "legal causation." See RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, at § 9. This
Comment distinguishes between factual and proximate causation because this is
the approach used by the majority of courts and this analysis is easier to under-
stand. SeeJim Gash, At the Intersection of Proximate Cause and Terrorism: A Contextual
Analysis of the (Proposed) Restatement Third of Torts' Approach to Intervening and
Superceding Causes, 91 Ky. LJ. 523, 529-30 (2002-03) (examining difference in defi-
nitions of factual and proximate causation in Restatement First and Second, and
drafts of Restatement Third).
75. See DOBBS, supra note 28, at § 115 (explaining "but for" cause in fact test).
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similar "but for" analysis will likely be used in the September 11 th
civil suits pending against the airlines. 76
5. Proximate Causation
Proximate causation is the most challenging aspect of the hy-
pothetical plaintiffs' suit. Proximate cause is difficult to define and
is often subjected to varying interpretations depending on the juris-
diction. 77 At its most basic level, proximate cause asks whether the
type of harm the defendant risked is within the scope of harm
which should subject someone to liability. 78 Proximate cause is
generally a question of fact for the jury, but it can be a question of
law for the judge to resolve when "reasonable people cannot dif-
fer."79 When proximate cause is a question of law, the court largely
engages in an exercise of "line drawing." 80 The court tries to deter-
mine whether certain harms are too remote to hold the defendant
liable. 81 Foreseeability is thus a key part of determining whether an
act is the proximate cause of the harm suffered. 82
The District Court for the Southern District of New York faced
the issue of "line drawing" in the September l1th civil suits. 83 The
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act ("Safety
Act") establishes that the only court with jurisdiction over lawsuits
arising from the September l1th terrorist attacks is the Southern
District of New York.84 The court set a time limit for when a lawsuit
76. See Gash, supra note 74, at 601-02. Gash argues in regard to civil suits by
September 1 1th victims' families that "it is beyond dispute that allowing the ter-
rorists onto the plane with the box-cutters was a factual cause of the harm suf-
fered." Id.
77. See id. at 528-30 (exploring history of definition of proximate cause); see
also W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984) (noting
confusion surrounding application of proximate cause doctrine).
78. See DOBBS, supra note 28, § 180 (citing proximate cause as also called "le-
gal cause" and defining it as "the appropriate scope of responsibility"); see also KEE-
TON, supra note 77, at § 41 (noting influence of policy on proximate causation).
"[L] egal limitation on the scope of liability is associated with policy - with our more
or less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands, or of what is adminis-
tratively possible and convenient." KEETON, supra note 77, at § 41.
79. In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining
proximate cause as sometimes being question for court).
80. See DOBBS, supra note 28, at § 181 (discussing "line drawing"). "[T]he line
against liability must be drawn somewhere and ... the proximate cause rules re-
flect the effort courts make to draw that line." Id.
81. See id. (explaining how courts establish proximate cause).
82. See id. (noting proximate cause often is "question of foreseeability").
83. For a discussion of the specific suits involved, see infra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text.
84. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 408(b)(3), 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001) [hereinafter September 11th Victim
20051
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relating to the September l1th tragedy no longer falls within the
jurisdictional limitation Congress imposed in the Safety Act.8 5 The
reasoning used to determine the limit of the jurisdictional grant of
the Safety Act is analogous to a proximate cause analysis.86 In the
context of the Safety Act, the court is asking when it is going too far
to say that a case "results from" the terrorist attack such that Con-
gress meant to limit jurisdiction of the case only to the Southern
District of New York.87
In the hypothetical, proximate causation asks whether a terror-
ist attack on Giants Stadium is a foreseeable event for which the
New York Giants should be liable.8 8 If the question is presented to
Fund]. Section 408(b)(3) requires: "The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
actions brought for any claim (including any claim for loss of property, personal
injury, or death) resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes
of September 11, 2001." Id.
85. See Graybill v. City of N.Y., 247 F. Supp. 2d 345, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). In
Graybil4 a construction worker was injured while cleaning up the World Trade
Center disaster site. See id. at 346. The court determined thatjurisdiction over the
case was not proper in federal court because: "Despite the rather broad language
of the jurisdictional grant in Section 408(b) (3) (of the Safety Act], Congress could
not have intended that every possible harm connected to the terrorist crashes of
September 11 . . .be brought into the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York .... " Id. at 352. The state court was the proper place for
the suit because the injuries the plaintiff suffered were "common to construction
and demolition sites generally, and risks and duties not alleged to be particular to
the special conditions caused by the [September 11 attacks]." Id. at 346; see also
Spagnuolo v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 245 F. Supp. 2d 518, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(relying on Graybill to dismiss from federal court similar suit brought by injured
construction worker). But see Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the Con-
text of September 11, 88 VA. L. REV. 1831, 1869 (2002) (criticizing 9/11 Victim Fund
for failing to include "exposure only claimants" in compensation). Had workers
who only suffered exposure injuries been included in the 9/11 Fund, they would
have been able to recover through the fund or pursue traditional tort options. See
id. Thus, the claims in Graybill and Spagnuolo would have been proper in federal
court under the Safety Act. For further discussion of the 9/11 Fund, see infra
notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
86. See GraybiU, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 351-52 (asserting analogy between deter-
mining jurisdictional limitation of Safety Act and proximate cause analysis); see also
Hickey v. City of N.Y., 270 F. Supp. 2d 357, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (relying on proxi-
mate cause comparison used in Graybill). In Hickey, the court dismissed on the
same jurisdictional limitations of the Safety Act relied upon in Graybil claims for
respiratory injuries caused to rescue workers who helped clean up the World
Trade Center site after a specified date. See 270 F. Supp. 2d at 361. The court
reasoned that if "death or injury occurred as demolition and clean-up efforts pro-
ceeded after September 29, 2001, the causal relationship with the terrorist-related
aircraft crashes becomes attenuated, and duties and responsibilities associated with
the workplace become predominant." Id. at 377.
87. See Graybil 247 F. Supp. 2d at 351-52 (discussing application of Congres-
sional limitation on jurisdiction).
88. See DOBBS, supra note 28, at § 181 (examining connection between proxi-
mate cause and foreseeability).
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the jury, the New York Giants will argue that proximate causation
should be defined narrowly.89 By using a narrow definition, the
New York Giants are hoping that liability will not be imposed. The
better option for the New York Giants is to have the judge rule as a
matter of law that proximate causation can not be found.90 Judge
determination has a better chance of being based more closely in
the law than jury determination because the judge may be less
swayed by sympathy for the fans than the jury. A number of factors
are relevant to the court deciding whether the act was a proximate
cause: (1) symbolic nature of the event attacked; (2) information
indicating foreseeability of attack; (3) any superceding and inter-
vening causes; and (4) policy considerations as to who should bear
responsibility for compensating victims of terrorism. Each of these
factors is discussed below.
The symbolic nature of the venue, a specific event being
hosted, or the date an event is taking place are considered under
proximate cause analysis. 91 A symbolic event, such as the Super
Bowl, or a symbolic date, such as the Fourth of July, may be tempt-
ing and foreseeable targets for a terrorist attack.92 High profile
events and dates aside, it is difficult to imagine a court holding that
a terrorist attack is foreseeable.9 3 In the hypothetical, the court
89. See Gash, supra note 74, at 603. The question of foreseeability may be a
broad or narrow one depending on who is framing the question. For example, in
defining foreseeabilty in civil litigation involving September 11 th, the airline indus-
try may state: "Unless you find that it is foreseeable that individuals allowed onto a
plane in Boston with two-inch blades will hijack the plane and intentionally fly it
into a skyscraper in New York, you must find that [United or American] was not a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries." Id. In contrast, the injured plaintiffs
would offer an alternative framing of proximate cause to the jury: "If you find that
allowing individuals onto a plane with two-inch blades creates a foreseeable risk of
personal injury or property damage to others, then you must find that [United or
American] was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries." Id. at 604.
90. See In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discuss-
ing court determination of proximate cause).
91. See Ron Hurst et al., American Sports As A Target of Terrorism: The Duty of Care
after September 11th, at http://www.mmwr.com/_uploads/UploadDocs/publica-
tions/American%20Sports%20As%20A%2OTarget%200f%2oTerrorism.pdf (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005). It is hard for sports and entertainment venues to know what
to prepare for: "[e]xcept for specific high profile events, such as the World Series,
the Super Bowl or the Olympics, which logically are greater symbolic targets, the
available threat information is general at best, causing leagues, teams and venues
to prepare for a range of possible incidents at their facilities . . . ." Id.
92. See id. (opining relevance of symbolism of event and date to foreseeability
of terrorism).
93. See Homburger & Grant, supra note 45, at 680 (noting changing defini-
tion of foreseeability post-September l1th). "In light of the September lth at-
tacks, is any terrorist attack now foreseeable, even in parts of the United States far
removed from major U.S. cities like New York City and Washington D.C.?" Id.; see
also Robert L. Rabin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: A Circumscribed
2005]
17
Piccarello: Terrorism, Tourism, and Torts: Liability in the Event of a Terror
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
382 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
would consider the proximity of Giants Stadium to the World Trade
Center as a factor indicating that terrorism may be foreseeable at
the venue. 94 The court could also consider any circumstances that
would make the stadium particularly vulnerable that day, such as a
significant event or special guests in attendance, perhaps an impor-
tant government official. 95
A second factor relevant to proximate cause is whether there
was specific information available indicating that a terrorist attack
might take place on that particular day or within a time period. 96
The Department of Homeland Security's color-coded terrorism
ranking system indicates foreseeability. 97 If the threat level is partic-
ularly high at the time of the hypothetical attack, the court may
hold that a terrorist attack was foreseeable to the New York
Giants.98
Superceding and intervening causes also influence the court's
analysis.99 An intervening cause is an act that occurs between the
initial act of negligence and the injury that does not sever the chain
Response or an Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 779 (2003) (noting diffi-
culty of foreseeability of terrorism). "[T]he foreseeability of case-specific terrorist
attacks in almost any given arena of public entertainment will always remain virtu-
ally nil. As a consequence, even without blanket immunity, private liability would
probably be the exceptional case." Rabin, supra, at 779; see also Fordham Symposium,
supra note 10, at 384 (quoting Paul Zoubek, Counsel, New Jersey Domestic
Preparedness Task Force). Zoubek remarked:
One of the greatest difficulties is that we know that there is a generalized
threat, but we do not have any specific information as to where a strike
might occur. So what we are engaged in is a generalized target harden-
ing, identifying where the vulnerabilities might be, and trying to make it
as safe as possible for people to decide that they will continue to go to
sporting events.
Fordham Symposium, supra note 10, at 384.
94. See Fordham Symposium, supra note 10, at 357 n.33 (noting proximity of
Giants Stadium to World Trade Center).
95. See Hurst, supra note 91 (opining on greater foreseeability of terrorism at
significant events and on significant dates).
96. See In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d 713, 738 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2004) (noting information available to Port Authority suggesting bombing
was imminent).
97. See Barkett, supra note 13, at 528 (questioning whether color-coded De-
partment of Homeland Security system will impact tort liability). The ranking sys-
tem alerts "government authorities, businesses, and the American public of a
security threat according to a series of graduated conditions." Schmidt, supra note
12, at 4. See generally Philip Shenon, Color-Coded System Created To Rate Threat of
Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at Al6 (describing reasons behind creation of
color-coded system and explaining how it works).
98. For a discussion of government warnings of a terrorist attack in the con-
text of breach of duty, see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
99. See Gash, supra note 74, at 579-88 (explaining use of superceding and in-
tervening causes).
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of causation. 10 0 In contrast, a superceding cause does sever the
chain of causation between the original act and the harm suf-
fered. 0 1 In the context of a negligence lawsuit based on injuries
inflicted by terrorism, the terrorist's actions may arguably constitute
a superceding cause relieving the defendant of liability.10 2 The
New York Giants would argue that even if they were negligent in
failing to implement adequate security measures, terrorist actions
sever the chain of causation. The jury will determine if the terror-
ist's actions are a superceding cause.' 0 3 The jury could be influ-
enced by the difficulty the victims may encounter in executing a
judgment against the terrorists if they are held as the only liable
defendants.' 04
100. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 234 (8th ed. 2004) (defining intervening
cause).
101. See id. at 235 (defining superceding cause).
102. See In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (identi-
fying unsuccessful argument by World Trade Center owners in their motion to
dismiss civil suit brought by victims of September l1th). "The Port Authority and
WTC Properties argue that they did not owe a duty to protect occupants in the
towers against injury from hijacked airplanes and, even if they did, the terrorists'
actions broke the chain of proximate causation, excusing any negligence by the
WTC Defendants." Id.; see also Gash, supra note 74, at 579-88 (discussing history of
superceding and intervening causes and application to civil suits arising out of
September 11th). But see Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305,
319 (3d Cir. 1999) (dismissing claim against fertilizer manufacturer regarding
1993 bombing of World Trade Center because terrorists' actions were "superced-
ing and intervening events breaking the chain of causation . . . [and thus the]
bombing was not proximately caused by the defendants"); Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Ex-
plosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 621 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding terrorists' use of
fertilizer manufactured by defendant in Oklahoma City bombing as superceding
cause relieving defendants of liability).
103. See Gash, supra note 74, at 586 n.199 (citing cases where jury determined
whether intervening act is foreseeable).
104. See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 162 (noting due to difficulty of recovering
judgment from terrorist groups, "the likely target for injured plaintiffs will be the
solvent party with the most broadly defined responsibility for protection - the
landowner"); see also Bob Van Voris, Sept. 11 laws raise fears of tort reform, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 3, 2001, at Al (discussing difficulty of collecting judgment if suit successful
against Osama Bin Laden); Anthony Sebok, Understanding Victims' Rights Under the
New Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, FINDLAw.COM, at http://
writ.findlaw.com/sebok/20011008.html (Oct. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Understanding
Victims' Rights] (discussing difficulty of suing terrorists). "Needless to say, it is a
fantasy to dream of suing the terrorists responsible [for September 11 th]. At least
19 are dead. Their remaining compatriots will be hard to find, and, if found, will
have other things to worry about than defending a tort suit." Understanding Victims'
Rights, supra. But see Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86,
91-92 (D.D.C. 2003) (allowing some claims filed by September l1th victims' fami-
lies to go forward against "nearly two hundred entities or persons - governments,
government agencies, banks, charitable foundations, and individuals, including
members of the Saudi royal family. . ." for supporting terrorists); Smith v. Islamic
Emirate of Afg., 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220, 240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (awarding Sep-
tember 1 th victim families default judgment against "Emirate of Afghanistan, the
20051 383
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Proximate cause "line drawing" necessarily implicates policy
questions as to how American society should compensate victims of
domestic terrorism. 105 Courts balance inflicting an unfair burden
on privately funded victim compensation with ensuring that the pri-
vate sector does its part to prevent terrorism.' 06 But these interests
may be properly resolved by the legislature and not the courts. 10 7
Such was the federal government's response to September lth.108
It remains to be seen whether this response will assist future defend-
ants such as the New York Giants in the hypothetical. 10 9
IV. THE LEGAL AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 1TH
Section III discussed the potential success of a negligence law-
suit against a sports or entertainment venue arising from a terrorist
attack under the pre-September 11 th legal environment. 110 An im-
portant caveat to Section III is the legislative response to September
l1th. Two pieces of legislation are particularly relevant: the Sep-
Taliban, al Qaeda, and ... Osama bin Laden" for economic losses and pain and
suffering); Jess Bravin & Kara Scannell, Sept. 11 Victims Can Sue Airlines, Boeing and
Landlord, WALL ST.J., Sept. 10, 2003, at BI (discussing suit filed by large insurance
companies against "Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Sudan"
in order "to recover damages from assets belonging to the defendants and frozen
by the U.S. government under antiterrorism legislation").
105. See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 200. Reynolds discusses compensation for
victims of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. See id. Her analysis is an eerie
premonition of the issues that have erupted concerning victim compensation re-
garding September l1th and future terrorist attacks. See id. Reynolds warns of the
counter-productivity that can result from tort-based victim compensation:
Our goals as a society are crime/terrorism prevention and victim com-
pensation, but landlord liability seems equitable only as a prevention
technique, not as a compensation mechanism. Expansive theories of lia-
bility, which have as their primary goals giving compensation to victims,
while certainly desirable, are best run by the government with funds
raised from society as a whole. Any rules placing burdens on landowners
should therefore have prevention, rather than compensation, as their pri-
mary goal.
Id.
106. See id. (discussing importance of balancing victim compensation with ter-
rorism prevention).
107. For a further discussion of the role of the private sector versus the gov-
ernment in victim compensation, see infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
108. See Rabin, supra note 85, at 1867 (opining reasons 9/11 Fund was created
was "mix of genuine outpouring of sympathy for the victims of September 11 and
great concern that the airline industry faced instant meltdown"). See generally Sep-
tember l1th Victim Fund, supra note 84, at §§ 401-09 (creating 9/11 Fund).
109. For a discussion of the possibility of government-funded compensation
being used as a model in the future, see infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
110. For a discussion of a negligence lawsuit, see supra notes 28-109 and ac-
companying text.
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tember l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 ("9/11 Fund")"1
and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Protection Act of 2002
("TRIA"). 1 12 These documents illustrate a commitment by the gov-
ernment to ease the financial burden of the attacks on the private
sector. 113 In the event of another terrorist attack, the 9/11 Fund
will serve as a model response.1 14 In such a case, the effects of the
hypothetical lawsuit would be diminished.
A. The 9/11 Fund
This section discusses the 9/11 Fund and its importance in es-
tablishing future government-funded victim compensation schemes
should a terrorist strike a sports or entertainment venue. First,
background on the creation of the 9/11 Fund is provided. 115 Sec-
ond, civil suits filed by September l1th victims who have decided
not to participate in the fund are considered. 1 6 Third, arguments
offered for and against using the 9/11 Fund as a model are
presented. 117
1. Creation of the 9/11 Fund
The 9/11 Fund is a government-funded compensation pro-
gram for victims of the September 11th tragedy."18 Congress cre-
111. See September 11th Victim Fund, supra note 84, at §§ 401-09. For a further
discussion of the 9/11 Fund, see Erin G. Holt, The September 11 Victim Compensation
Fund: Legislative Justice Sui Genertis, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 513, 558 (2004)
(criticizing constitutionality of 9/11 Fund and offering alternative approach); see
also Marshall S. Shapo, Compensation for Victims of Terror: A Specialized Jurisprudence of
Injury, 30 HorsRA L. REV. 1245 (2002) (analyzing 9/11 Fund and Congress' moti-
vations for its passage). See generally Richard P. Campbell, The September 11th Attack
on America: Ground Zero in Tort and Insurance Law, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 51, 56-94 (2002-
03) (analyzing major post-September 11th legislation).
112. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat.
2322 (2002) [hereinafter TRIAl.
113. See Anthony J. Sebok, Sneaky tort reform, NAT'L L.J.,Jan. 14, 2002, at A21
(examining purpose of Acts).
114. For a discussion of the use of the 9/11 Fund as a model for the future,
see infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
115. For a discussion of the background on the creation of the 9/11 Fund,
see infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
116. For a discussion of the civil suit alternative, see infta notes 125-32 and
accompanying text.
117. For a discussion of the competing arguments regarding the 9/11 Fund,
see infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
118. See Anthony Sebok, Disaster Plan: Can the Sept. 11 fund's alternative to court
resolve future mass torts?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 25, 2002, at 26 [hereinafter Disaster
Plan] (describing 9/11 Fund). See generally September 11th Victim Fund, supra note
84, at § 403 (describing purpose of Act). Section 403 states: "It is the purpose of
this title to provide compensation to any individual (or relatives of a deceased
individual) who was physically injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related
38520051
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ated the 9/11 Fund to provide fast, guaranteed, and "no fault
compensation" to victims. 119 The 9/11 Fund also ensured the fi-
nancial solvency of the airline industry from the inevitable lawsuits
that resulted in the wake of the tragedy. 120 The 9/11 Fund received
much attention from legal commentators due to the relative haste
with which legislation creating the fund passed and the rareness of
government-funded compensation. 121 The 9/11 Fund offers an al-
ternative to a traditional tort suit. 122 Most victims took advantage of
the 9/11 Fund, thereby forfeiting their right to a civil suit, except
aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001." Id. The process for submitting a claim isproscribed in the Act. See id. § 405. Kenneth R. Feinberg was appointed as Special
Master of the 9/11 Fund. See Holt, supra note 111, at 516 n.19 (describing Fein-berg as "one of the forerunners in third party dispute resolution" and former assis-
tant to Senator Edward Kennedy). Feinberg developed the procedures used to
administer the 9/11 Fund including refining the definitions of who qualifies as an
eligible claimant and drafting the paperwork necessary to receive compensation.
See id. at 518-19. Once a claim is filed, Feinberg then uses a formula to compute
the amount of compensation awarded. See id. at 519-22.
119. See Peter H. Schuck, The Last Days of the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund, LEGAL TIMES, June 7, 2004, at 76 (noting 9/11 Fund awards as "more gener-
ous and quickly and easily obtained than most tort remedies"); see also Understand-
ing Victims' Rights, supra note 104 (weighing advantages of victims accepting
compensation through 9/11 Fund versus tort suit). See generally September 11th Vic-
tim Fund, supra note 84, at § 405 (detailing requirements for receiving compensa-
tion). Section 405(b) (3) requires that a determination of compensation be given
"[n]ot later than 120 days after that date on which a claim is filed .... " See id.§ 405(b)(3). Section 405(c) qualifies anyone physically injured or the relatives of
an individual killed as a result of the September 11th attacks as eligible for com-pensation. See id. § 405(c). Section 405(b) (2) authorizes no-fault compensation
because the Special Master is not to "consider negligence or any other theory of
liability" in reviewing claims. Id. § 405(b) (2).
120. See Rabin, supra note 93, at 771 n.2 (commenting that title, "Air Trans-
portation Safety and System Stabilization Act" is symbolic of primary purpose ofAct); see also Disaster Plan, supra note 118, at 26 (observing airline industry onlyinitially sought Congressional limitation on liability and only supported govern-
ment-funded victim compensation when realizing limited liability would not be
provided without it); Jessica Ramirez, Note, The Victims Compensation Fund: A Modelfor Future Mass Casualty Situations, 29 TRNsp. L.J. 283, 288 (2002) (citing criticism
that 9/11 Fund was established mainly as "cost saving mechanism for the airlines"
and not victim compensation).
121. See AnthonyJ. Sebok, Assessing the New Airline Law: Not Just A Bailout, ButAlso A Huge Tort Reform Plan, FINDLAw.COM, at http:writ.corporate.findlaw.com/
scripts/printerfriendly.pl?page=/Sebok/20010924.html (Sept. 24, 2001) [herein-
after Assessing Law] (analyzing uniqueness of 9/11 Fund and noting only other
time government implemented similar program was National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986). For a discussion of legal commentators' critiques of the 9/11Fund as a model for future victim compensation, see infra notes 135-37 and accom-
panying text.
122. See Romero, supra note 31, at 64 (providing comparison of benefits of9/11 Fund versus traditional tort suit); see also Assessing Law, supra note 121 (offer-
ing analysis of Safety Act in comparison to traditional tort reform).
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against the terrorists themselves.1 23 Others turned to the courts for
recovery. 1 2 4
2. Pursuing Tort Suit over Compensation from the 9/11 Fund
There are three main reasons why a victim's family might
choose to pursue a civil remedy instead of opting for compensation
from the 9/11 Fund. 125 First and foremost, some victims' families
want what the 9/11 Fund cannot provide: accountability from those
who played a role in allowing the September 11 th tragedy to hap-
pen. 126 While a tort suit may not provide these answers, it does
open the door to getting answers that receiving compensation from
the 9/11 Fund would shut.127 Second, the 9/11 Fund may not ade-
quately compensate a victim's family, especially those of wealthier
victims. 12 8 But a tort suit will not guarantee these families fairer
compensation because the Safety Act imposes a cap on the amount
123. See Schuck, supra note 119, at 76 (noting number of claims filed).
"[A] pproximately 97 percent of the death claimants and more than 4,000 personal
injury claimants . . ." filed for compensation with the 9/11 Fund. Id. See generally,
September llth Victim Fund, supra note 84, at § 405(c) (3) (B)(i) (excluding right to
civil suit for victims filing under 9/11 Fund and section 408(c) allowing civil suits
against terrorists). For a discussion of the civil suits filed against the terrorists, see
supra note 104 and accompanying text.
124. Approximately 100 families filed civil suits instead of taking compensa-
tion from the 9/11 Fund. See Michelle Garcia, Nearly 100 Families Are Suing Over
9/11, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2004, at A9.
125. See Bravin & Scannell, supra note 104, at BI (offering reasons why Sep-
tember 11 th victim would sue instead of pursuing compensation from 9/11 Fund);
see also AnthonyJ. Sebok, The Hardest Job in the Law: The Judge Who Hears September 11
Suits, and His Recent Decision to Let The Suits Go Forward, FINDLAW.COM, at http://
writ.findlaw.com/sebok/20030922.html (Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Hardest Job]
(evaluating whether it is more advantageous for 9/11 victim's family to take advan-
tage of 9/11 Fund or tort suit). Sebok notes that a victim's family who chooses the
civil litigation route faces "months or years of uncertainty and litigation may only
result in the plaintiffs receiving the same amount - or, worse, far less - than they
would have received from the Fund." Hardest Job, supra; see also Understanding Vic-
tims' Rights, supra note 104 (comparing tort suit versus 9/11 Fund recovery).
126. See Ramirez, supra note 120, at 295-97 (discussing inability of 9/11 Fund
to offer victims' families accountability for the attack); see also Garcia, supra note
124, at A9 (reporting one victim's family decided to sue to "search for answers").
127. See Bravin & Scannell, supra note 104, at BI (quoting University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley law professor Stephen Sugarman). Sugarman remarked, "'[niow
we'll have a chance to decide whether America was at fault instead of the foreign-
ers . . . [a]nd that's very much what Congress and the [P]resident were trying to
avoid [by creating the 9/11 Fund].'" Id.
128. See Ramirez, supra note 120, at 287 (noting awards to higher income vic-
tims are lower because law requires them to be offset by amounts received from
collateral sources like life insurance); see also Michael I. Meyerson, Editorial, Losses
of Equal Value, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, at WK15 (opining that "families of the
firefighter and the financier, the broker and the busboy, with their shared emo-
tional losses, should be compensated equally"). See generally Holt, supra note 111,
at 520-22 (explaining how awards are calculated).
2005]
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of damages recoverable.' 29 Further, liability is limited to the
amount of insurance a defendant carried on September llth. 130
Third, individuals who suffered property damage or loss of a busi-
ness are not eligible to receive compensation from the 9/11
Fund.' 13 If their insurance does not adequately cover their loss, the
traditional civil suit is the only possibility they have for receiving
money.132
3. Government-Funded Victim Compensation as an Alternative to Tort
Law
The 9/11 Fund is the first time government-funded compensa-
tion has been provided to victims of terrorism and their families.133
The 9/11 Fund could be a model for future recovery programs.134
The 9/11 Fund is therefore relevant to the discussion of the liability
of sports and entertainment venues in the event of a terrorist at-
tack. The main argument supporting use of this model is that the
costs of a terrorist attack are more properly borne by the govern-
ment than the private sector. 135 This argument recognizes the diffi-
129. See September 11th Victim Fund, supra note 84, at § 408(a) (imposing limita-
tion on liability for damages).
130. See id. Section 408(a), Limitation on Air Carrier Liability, states:
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, liability for all claims, whether for
compensatory or punitive damages, arising from the terrorist-related aircraft
crashes of September 11, 2001, against any air carrier shall not be in an amountgreater than the limits of the liability coverage maintained by the air carrier." Id.;
see also Disaster Plan, supra note 118, at 26 (discussing insurance coverage
limitation).
131. See September 11th Victim Fund, supra note 84, at § 405(c) (limiting 9/11
Fund eligibility only to those suffering physical injuries or death).
132. See Romero, supra note 31, at 64 (discussing possible suits over property
insurance coverage and noting insurance may not fully compensate those suffering
property damage and related purely economic losses).
133. See Ramirez, supra note 120, at 289 (noting 9/11 Fund as first govern-
ment-funded terrorist victim compensation, and citing criticism by victims of previ-
ous terrorist attacks as to why September 11 th victims deserve special treatment);
see also Stuart Taylor Jr., Fairness Without Suits, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 7, 2002, at 35(arguing September 1 th victims are no more entitled to compensation than other
victims of terrorism who have not been given same benefits).
134. See Ramirez, supra note 120, at 298 (analyzing 9/11 Fund and hypothesiz-
ing about its use in future).
135. See Assessing Law, supra note 121 (advocating 9/11 Fund). One commen-
tator noted, "the debt owed to the victims should fall on all our shoulders ....[T]ort litigation .. .[has its] place when tragedies come in two and threes. But
not when they come as a national wound." Id.; see also Reynolds, supra note 30, at
169 (concluding it is inequitable to impose liability against landlords); Stephen P.Watters & Joseph S. Lawder, The Permanent Impact of September 11th, BENCH & B. OFMINN., Sept. 2002, at 21 (recognizing "business[es] cannot be expected to carry
out a governmental function, such as police-force security, justif[ying] the creation
of and compensation of victims from the 'no fault' Fund").
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culty the private sector faces in protecting against terrorism.
Further, the use of tort law would allow the imposition of liability
on "blameless defendants."'
136
In contrast, those critical of the 9/11 Fund argue that govern-
ment-funded compensation fails to encourage the private sector to
prevent terrorism. 137 It is difficult to know which argument is
stronger. Hopefully the question will never need answering. As-
suming terrorists do not strike again, victim compensation will
never become an issue.
B. The TRIA
Another significant piece of post-September 11 th legislation is
the TRIA. 138 The TRIA is aimed at stabilizing the insurance indus-
try.139 Following September llth, insurance companies were wary
of insuring against future terrorist attacks.' 40 The government re-
sponded with the TRIA to help absorb the cost of terrorism insur-
ance and to make the insurance more affordable for businesses.'
4
'
136. Taylor, supra note 133, at 35; see also Loubier & Aro, supra note 15, at 20
(noting "there is little a building owner can do to prevent attacks like those of
September 11. Responsibility for preventing such acts of terrorism falls largely to
the federal government."). But see In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot. on Dec. 21,
1988, 811 F. Supp. 84, 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying defendant security company's
motion for judgment as matter of law, and thus, affirming jury verdict finding de-
fendant security company and airline company's "willful misconduct" proximately
caused terrorist bombing of plane); Roberts, supra note 15, at 31 (criticizing tour-
ism venues that "mistakenly view issues related to terrorism and security as matters
for the government and not the private sector").
137. See Leo V. Boyle, Victims Fund Will Work, but Don't Toss Torts, LEGAL TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2002, at 53 (noting President of Association of Trial Lawyers offering skep-
ticism on ability of government to protect public from private sector dangers and
citing tort law as "only meaningful and effective deterrent").
138. TRIA, supra note 112. For an analysis of the TRIA, see LucianJ. Dhooge,
A Previously Unimaginable Risk Potential: September 11 and the Insurance Industry, 40
AM. Bus. L.J. 687 (2003) (analyzing effects of September 1Ith on insurance indus-
try and examining components of TRIA); Elizabeth Pietanza, Comment, Winning
the Risky Global Business Game: Parrying the Thrusts of Terrorism with an International
Insurance Coalition, 34 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 85, 94-101, 107-10 (2003) (analyzing
TRIA); Mario Suarez & Steven Abrams, Terrorism Risk Insurance and the Real Estate
Industry, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 10, 2002, at 4 (explaining TRIA's affect on real estate
industry).
139. See Pietanza, supra note 138, at 94. The TRIA was enacted "to provide
continued coverage and affordable and predictable premiums for terrorism insur-
ance while the insurance sector stabilizes from its September 11 losses." Id.
140. See id. (discussing motivation for passage of TRIA).
141. See id. Many companies are not purchasing terrorism insurance. Some
company executives argue the coverage is still too expensive or, more interestingly,
because they think the government will offer the same financial assistance it pro-
vided after September 11th. See Joseph B. Treaster, Insurance For Terrorism Still a
Rarity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2003, at Cl. A future terrorist attack may be more finan-
cially devastating "today than on Sept. 11 ... because [t] errorism was regarded as a
20051
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An earlier version of the TRIA had another goal in mind: perma-
nent tort reform.' 42 The House of Representatives ("House")
passed a version of the TRIA that permanently limited the ability of
future terrorist victims to sue anyone but the terrorists them-
selves. 143 Had this version passed the Senate, the New York Giants
would not need to be overly concerned about the financial impact
of the hypothetical lawsuit. The House version represents the hope
expressed by some business owners that the government will shield
them from liability in the event of another terrorist attack.144 Thus,
the House version is a disincentive for companies to improve secur-
ity measures. If businesses know they will not be liable in the event
of an attack, they have little incentive to pay for expensive improve-
ments. 145 The final version of the TRIA, however, does not give
rarity in the United States then and coverage for such attacks was included free in
commercial policies." Id. Consequently, in the absence of companies purchasing
the terrorism insurance, government assistance may be necessary in the event of
another attack. See id.
142. See AnthonyJ. Sebok, Why Congress Should ReJect the Republicans'Proposal toLimit All Future Terrorism Victims'Ability to Seek Compensation in Court, FINDLAw.COM,
at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20011203.html (Dec. 3, 2001) (advocating9/11 Fund but criticizing TRIA provision allowing for permanent bar on future
civil suits).
143. Id. The key limitation provisions of the House version of the TRIA can
be described as follows:
[T] he bill would bar punitive damages, eliminate joint and several liabil-
ity for non-economic damages (under which a plaintiff can go after any
or all defendants for compensation), require that all damage awards be
off-set by collateral sources such as insurance or gifts, and limit lawyers'
fees to 20% of the award.
Id. Other commentators are also critical of the House version. See Dhooge, supra
note 138, at 772 (describing criticism of TRIA provision for limiting future terror-
ist civil litigation); see also U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy, President Signs Terrorism InsuranceBill - Reaction Of Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy, at http://leahy.senate.gov/
press/200211/112602a.html (Nov. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Reaction] (criticizing
House bill). Senator Leahy remarked: "[t]he liability limits for future terrorist at-
tacks in the House-passed bill were irresponsible because they restricted the legal
rights of victims and their families and discouraged private industry from taking
appropriate precautions to promote public safety." Reaction, supra.
144. See Pietanza, supra note 138, at 107-08 (noting corporate expectance ofgovernment assistance). "In the event of another terrorist attack, corporations
may simply expect federal assistance just as they did following the September 11
attacks." Id.; see also Editorial, Next bailout: Insurers?, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 28, 2001, atC6 (fearing government is establishing precedent of permanent "bail out" plan attaxpayers' expense to help industries affected by terrorism instead of lendingplan); Treaster, supra note 141, at CI (noting small number of companies purchas-
ing terrorism insurance possibly because of belief that in event of another attack
government will provide funding).
145. See Pietanza, supra note 138, at 99-100 (quoting TRIA § 107(a)(1)).
Pietanza discusses criticism of the limitation as follows:
Members of Congress argue that if such protection was afforded, it couldprevent businesses from taking precautionary steps against a future ter-
rorist attack. Corporations fear the potentially devastating amounts of
[Vol. 12: p. 365
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businesses tort immunity. 146 The fact that the House version ever
existed may bode well for the coffers of sports and entertainment
venues in the future. Perhaps a similar limited liability provision
will surface again in a future government-funded compensation
plan.
V. CONCLUSION
The risk of terrorist attacks on sports and entertainment ve-
nues is a reality in post-September 11 th America. 147 It is also a real-
ity that even the greatest security in the world might not stop a
terrorist. It makes good business sense for venue owners to prevent
their venues from being targeted by terrorist groups. 148 Consumers
will avoid going to venues if the owners do not offer assurances that
they are committed to security. A decline in attendance causes de-
creased profits. Venue owners must balance this business interest
with the possibility of liability. 149 Should the venue owner be sub-
ject to a tort suit, it would be difficult for victims to establish all of
the elements necessary for a negligence case. 150 Should a case
make it to the jury, they may be swayed by sympathy for the victims
and hold the defendant liable, especially if the attack is as large and
tragic as that of September 11th. 1 5 1 Mass tort suits may not reach
the courts, though, if Congress passes legislation similar to the
House version of the TRIA, banning all suits against defendants
other than the terrorist themselves. 152 The government could also
intervene with a victim compensation scheme like the 9/11
damages awarded to victims of civil lawsuits. However, because TRIA al-
lows for consolidation of suits, uncertainty is reduced because of the sin-
gle forum and legal standard to be employed.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
146. See id. at 96 (quoting TRIA § 107(a) (1)).
147. For a discussion of why sports and entertainment venues are susceptible
to a terrorist attack, see supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
148. For a discussion of possible negligence lawsuits should a sports venue not
implement adequate security measures, see supra notes 28-109 and accompanying
text.
149. For a discussion of the possibility of future government-funded compen-
sation intervening to prevent a tort suit, see supra notes 133-37 and accompanying
text.
150. For a discussion of the elements of a negligence case as applied to a
hypothetical terrorist attack, see supra notes 40-109 and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of sympathy swaying a jury into holding a defendant
liable, see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of the House version of the TRIA, see supra notes 142-45
and accompanying text.
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Fund.153 The government may not be as willing to fund compensa-
tion, though, especially if evidence shows businesses are relying
upon it and not implementing adequate security measures as a re-
sult.1 54 Venue owners, while realizing it is not likely they will be
liable in tort, must still be vigilant in improving their security mea-
sures. This motivation should not be driven entirely by public ex-
pectation, but primarily because it is the right thing to do.
Caitlin M. Piccarello
153. For a discussion of the 9/11 Fund, see supra notes 118-37 and accompa-
nying text.
154. For a discussion of a business owner's expectation of government assis-
tance in the wake of another terrorist attack, see supra notes 135-37 and accompa-
nying text.
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